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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel Lee Eby appeals from the district court's order denying his petition
for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts of the underlying criminal
case as follows:
According to the State's evidence, the victim, Mel Evenson,
was murdered late in the night of March 25 or early the next
morning. On that night, Daniel Eby, Jeremy Schmitz, Cliff Hicks
and Evenson were working on cars in a garage belonging to Gerald
Smith. Inside the adjacent residence were Smith and several other
individuals. While in the garage, Evenson was repeatedly struck in
the head with a baseball bat and with a large wrench. His clothing
was removed and was then burned in a wood stove in the garage.
Evenson's body was wrapped in a tarp and placed in the bed of his
own truck. The body was then covered with flattened cardboard
boxes, and the truck was abandoned in the countryside.
State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 536, 37 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
"It was the prosecution's theory that, on the evening in question, Eby,
Schmitz and Hicks believed that Evenson was carrying a substantial amount of
narcotics and cash because he had just returned from an out-of-town drug
transaction, and the three decided to kill Evenson in order to steal his money and
drugs."

!fl In statements admitted at the subsequent trial, Eby told detectives

that on the night of the murder, he stood guard while Hicks and Schmitz beat
Evenson to death, searched his clothes for drugs and money, and then
concealed the body.

!fl at 539, 37 P.3d at 630.

The state ultimately charged Eby with first degree murder under
1

alternative theories of felony murder and premeditation, conspiracy to commit
~

robbery, and attempted robbery.
found Eby guilty of all charges.

~

at 536, 539, 37 P.3d at 627, 630. A jury
at 536, 37 P.3d at 627. The district court

imposed a unified life sentence with twenty-five years fixed for first-degree
murder, and concurrent lesser sentences for conspiracy to commit robbery and
attempted robbery.

~

On direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Eby's convictions
for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery, but reversed Eby's
conviction for attempted robbery, holding that that offense merged with the
conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder theory.

~

at 536-541,

37 P.3d at 627-632.
Eby filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief.
State, 148 Idaho 731, 733, 228 P.3d 998, 1000 (2010).
appointed counsel to represent him on the petition.

~

See Eby v.

The district court

Over the next several

years, Eby's various appointed attorneys failed to amend his petition or otherwise
advance Eby's claims.

~

at 733-734, 228 P.3d at 1000-1001. The district court

dismissed the petition for inactivity.

~

at 733, 228 P.3d at 1000. The court later

denied Eby's I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the dismissal order, concluding
that I.R.C.P. 60(b) does not apply to I.R.C.P. 40(c) dismissals for inactivity.

Id.

at 734, 228 P.3d at 1001.
Eby appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that
I.R.C.P. 60(b) does apply to I.R.C.P. 40(c) dismissals.

~

at 734-738, 228 P.3d

at 1001-1005. The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the

2

facts presented by Eby constituted grounds for relief in this case.

lfL On

remand, the district court granted such relief, withdrawing its previously entered
dismissal of Eby's post-conviction petition. (R., p.4.)
Through new appointed counsel, Eby filed an amended petition for postconviction relief with supporting affidavit raising three claims: (1) that he was
denied his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel; (2) that there were material
facts not previously presented and heard that required a vacating of his
conviction in the interest of justice pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4 ); and (3) that
his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to adequately
communicate with him, failing to advise him of his rights, failing to adequately
prepare for trial, and for preventing Eby from testifying on his own behalf. (R.,
pp.6-10; Supp. R., 1 pp.2-8.)

The district court took judicial notice of the

underlying criminal case file, 2 ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held, and
entertained pre- and post-evidentiary hearing briefing from the parties.

(R.,

pp.13-14, 21-31, 34-48; see 7/5/11 Tr.)
In a memorandum decision, the district court denied Eby's petition for
post-conviction relief, concluding that Eby failed to meet his burden to show he

1

A Supplemental Clerk's Record with additional documents was prepared after
Eby objected to the record. (Supp. R., pp.21-23.)

2

While the district court took judicial notice of the entire underlying criminal case
file, the Idaho Supreme Court has not done the same with regard to this appeal.
Missing portions of record are presumed to support decision of trial court. State
v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996).
3

was entitled to relief. (R., pp.49-59.) Eby timely appealed. 3 (R., pp.60-62.)

3

The SAPD was appointed to represent Eby in his appeal. (R., pp.63-65.}
However, the SAPD subsequently withdrew from the representation of Eby
based on their inability to "find a viable issue for appeal." (6/7/12 Memorandum
In Support of Motion to Withdraw, p. 6; 7/6/12 Order Granting Motion for Leave to
Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.) Eby has proceeded in the
appeal prose. (See Appellant's brief.)
4

ISSUES
Eby states the issues on appeal as:
A.

Did the District Court Error [sic] In Denying Mr. Eby's Conflict
of Interest Claim's [sic]?

B.

Did The District Court Error [sic] In Denying Mr. Eby's
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim's [sic]?

(Appellant's brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Eby failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing?

5

ARGUMENT
Eby Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court's Denial Of His Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing

A

Introduction
Eby asserts that the district court erred in denying his petition for post-

conviction relief. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) Eby, however, has failed to
assign any specific error to the district court and has instead simply repeated his
post-conviction claims in his Appellant's brief.

(lg_,_)

In any event, the record

reveals that Eby failed to meet his burden to show he was entitled to postconviction relief, and that the district court thus did not err in denying his petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters

findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).

A trial court's decision that a post-

conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939,940, 792 P.2d 964,965 (Ct. App. 1990).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108,
110 (Ct. App. 2003).

6

C.

Eby Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil

proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence."

McKay v. State, 148 Idaho

567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834,
838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)).
In this case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Eby's postconviction claims, but concluded that he failed to meet his burden to show he
was entitled to relief. (R., pp.49-59; 7/5/11 Tr.) In his statement of issues, Eby
asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his post-conviction claims.
(Appellant's brief, p.2.)

Eby, however, fails to assign any specific error to the

district court regarding any of these claims.

(See generally, Appellant's brief.)

This Court should affirm the district court's denial of Eby's petition on this basis.
State v. Walker, 121 Idaho 18, 20, 822 P.2d 537, 539 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
than an appellate court will not search the record for unspecified error nor
presume error); see also State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970
(1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.").
In any event, a review of the record reveals that the district court did not
err in concluding that Eby failed to meet his burden to show he was entitled to
relief on any of his claims.

7

1.

Eby Failed To Show That His Sixth Amendment Right To ConflictFree Representation Was Violated

The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment
as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1931 ).

The right has been

accorded "not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of
the accused to receive a fair trial." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002)
(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). It follows from this that
assistance which is ineffective in preserving fairness does not meet the
constitutional mandate. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 296, 90 P.3d 278,
285 (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
Where a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel conflictbased claim alleging his counsel's personal interests directly conflict with
counsel's obligation to provide effective representation, the defendant must
demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his
lawyer's performance. Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 61-62, 90 P.3d at 286-287; see
also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (where defendant alleges a
conflict based upon his counsel's simultaneous representation of defendant and
the prosecutor's key witness, defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance). Absent such a showing,
a defendant is not entitled to reversal of his conviction.

Mickens, 535 U.S. at

173-74; Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987).
An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by whether there
is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n.5.
8

"[T]he possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction."
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62, 106 P.3d 376, 388 (2004) (citations omitted).
An actual conflict will be shown to adversely affect counsel's performance where
a link between counsel's deficient performance and the conflict of interest is
demonstrated. See Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9 th Cir. 2004); see also
United States v. Burns, 526 F.3d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 2008) (actual conflict
adversely affects counsel's performance when "there was some plausible
alternative defense strategy that could have been pursued, but was not, because
of the actual conflict").
Under most circumstances, a conflict of one attorney with an individual is
automatically "imputed" to the other attorneys in his or her firm.

See State v.

Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 792-793, 171 P.3d 1282, 1290-1291 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Smith v. State, 126 Idaho 106, 110, 878 P.2d 805, 809 (Ct. App. 1994)).
Therefore, there is generally a per se conflict of interest where attorneys in a
single law firm concurrently represent individuals with adverse interests.

See

Cook,
Cook,
- 144 Idaho at 792-793; 171 P.3d at 1290-1291. However, in - the
Idaho Court of Appeals held that there is no such per se conflict where different
attorneys within a public defender's office concurrently represent individuals with
adverse interests.

kl at 791-794,

171 P.3d at 1289-1292. The Court recognized

that "automatically disqualifying a public defender where another attorney in the
office has a conflict of interest would significantly hamper the ability to provide
legal representation of indigent clients," and that "such concurrent representation
by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or otherwise) for

9

diminished advocacy in such cases." _kl at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292.

Instead,

such conflict questions should be addressed by trial courts on a case-by-case
basis, where the court takes individual situations into consideration to determine
whether a defendant's right to counsel is threatened by competing interests .

.kl

In this case, Eby asserted that his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free
representation was violated because he was represented by two deputy
attorneys of the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, while one of his codefendants, who made statements to police implicating Eby in the murder, was
represented by the Kootenai County Public Defender, who had supervisory
authority over the deputies. (R., pp. 7 -8, 28-29, 34-37.)
However, the district court correctly concluded that Eby failed to show a
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (R., pp.53-55.) Citing Cook, the district
court both recognized that there was no per se bar to the Kootenai County Public
Defender's Office's representation of both Eby and his co-defendant, and
conducted an appropriate analysis of the concurrent representation employed in
this case. (Id.)
The district court made the unchallenged factual finding that the Kootenai
County Public Defender's Office erected a "Chinese wall" 4 that separated the
representations of Eby and his co-defendant. (R., pp.51-52.) When such a "wall"
is in place, there is no discussion or exchange of information between attorneys
potentially implicated by a conflict.

(7/5/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-11; p.47, Ls.13-22.)

4

At the evidentiary hearing, Eby's appointed trial attorneys and the Kootenai
County Public Defender testified that "Chinese walls" were a common practice of
the office at the time of its representation of Eby, but are no longer preferred.
(7/5/11 Tr., p.13, L.20- p.14, L.8; p.25, L.4- p.26, L.9; p.47, L.7 -p.48, L.7.)
10

Eby's appointed attorneys testified that there was nothing about the concurrent
representation that affected any of the decisions they made representing Eby.
(R., pp.51-52.) Eby did not show that the "Chinese wall" was compromised in
this particular case, nor did Eby identify any specific adverse effect of the
concurrent representation. (R., pp.54-55.)
Because Eby failed to assign specific error to the district court in its
rejection of his claim that he was denied conflict-free counsel, this Court should
decline to consider this issue on appeal. In any event, the record reveals that the
district court properly concluded that Eby failed to show that the Kootenai County
Public Defender's Office's concurrent representation of Eby and his co-defendant
hampered Eby's counsel's ability to effectively represent him. Eby thus failed to
show that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.

2.

Eby Failed To Show That Material Evidence Not Previously
Presented Required Vacation Of His Conviction Pursuant To I.C. §
19-4901 (a)(4)

A petitioner for post conviction relief may claim, as grounds for relief,
"[t]hat there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and
heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interests of
justice." I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4).
In his petition, Eby asserted that there existed such material facts that
required a vacating of his conviction, but he did not identify any such facts in
either his petition or pre-evidentiary hearing briefing. (R., pp.8, 28-31.) At the
evidentiary hearing, Eby shed some light on this claim, testifying that his cousin
"alleged [Eby] had a splitting maul, sledge hammer or a pipe wrench and that
11

[Eby] hit Mr. Evenson with it," and that this allegation was inconsistent "with the
autopsy [which] showed that a baseball bat killed [Evenson.]" (7/5/11 Tr., p.104,
Ls.15-18; p.108, Ls.12-20.) In his post-hearing briefing, Eby asserted that "this
information was not presented to the jury and in the interests of justice this
requires that Mr. Eby's [p]etition be granted." (R., pp.37-38.)
In rejecting Eby's assertion, the district court stated that it was "not
persuaded by [Eby's] testimony that the weapon he was alleged to have used
could not have caused the injuries, because Dr. Bernard, the State's expert at
trial, testified that the injuries were all caused by similar weapons." (R., p.58.)
Indeed, Dr. Bernard testified at trial that while "some type of cylindrical object"
inflicted the injuries to Evenson's skull, he could not determine whether the
injuries to Evenson's head and ribs were all inflicted with the same weapon, or
even specifically what type of weapon was utilized.

(See R., pp.44-46.)

The

district court continued, "[Eby's] testimony then, while not previously heard, is not
evidence that the jury did not consider at trial." (R., p.58.)
Further, Eby was convicted under a felony murder theory, which did not
require that he directly participated in Evenson's murder. Eby 136 Idaho at 537540, 37 P.3d at 628-642 (holding that the admission of inadmissible hearsay
statements from Eby's co-defendant that Eby beat Evenson was harmless
because the properly admitted evidence at Eby's trial "overwhelmingly proves
that [Eby] participated in the attempted robbery that culminated in the murder of
Evenson").

No evidence or new argument by Eby regarding whether he directly

participated in the murder, regardless of how persuasive it was, would require a

12

vacating of his conviction in the interest of justice where he was ultimately
convicted merely of participating in the attempted robbery that culminated in
Evenson's murder.
Because Eby failed to assign specific error to the district court in its denial
of his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) claim, this Court should not consider this claim on
appeal. In any event, the record reveals that Eby failed to present evidence of
material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of his
conviction in the interest of justice. Eby has thus failed to show that the district
court erred in denying this post-conviction clam.

3.

Eby Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel

A petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
must prove "that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that this
deficiency resulted in prejudice." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d
1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d
424 (1989)).
"To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was
competent and diligent." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362,
367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted). To meet this burden "requires showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687.

"[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on
13

appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance
of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Baldwin,
145 Idaho at 153-54, 177 P.3d at 367-68.
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174,
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App.
1999).
In his post-conviction petition, Eby raised an ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim that contained several sub-claims: (1) his trial counsel failed to
adequately communicate with him; (2) his trial counsel failed to advise him of his
rights; (3) his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial; and (4) his trial
counsel prevented Eby from testifying on his own behalf. (R., pp.6-1 O; Supp. R.,
pp.2-8.)

In its response brief, the state argued that each of Eby's ineffective

assistance of counsel sub-claims was either conclusory and unsupported, or
disproved by Eby's written not guilty plea and transcript of the sentencing
hearing.

(R., pp.23-27.)

In reply, Eby did not dispute that his claims were

unsupported, but asserted that he would "establish his claims for [postconviction] relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel through his
[evidentiary hearing] testimony." (R., pp.29-30.)
At the evidentiary hearing, Eby's trial attorneys testified that they had
limited independent recollection of their representation of Eby. (7/5/11 Tr., p.21,
L.24 - p.89, L.11.)

However, as summarized by the district court, they also

14

testified that they had a "regular practice and policy of informing clients of their
rights, preparing for trial, explaining legal procedures, and consulting clients with
regard to trial and sentencing strategy." (R., p.57.) The district court specifically
found these attorneys' testimony to be more "substantive and credible" than
Eby's testimony that he "could not remember the proceedings, but he could
remember that his attorneys failed to consult with him regarding his rights, the
legal procedures, and the strategy at trial and sentencing."

(R., pp.56-57.)

Finally, the district court concluded that Eby failed to show how he was
prejudiced by any deficiency. (R., p.57.)
In his Appellant's brief, other than in his statement of issues on appeal,
Eby has entirely failed to either assign specific error to the district court in
denying his ineffective assistance of trial claim, or even discuss the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims he raised below. (See generally, Appellant's
brief.) This Court should thus decline to consider this issue. In any event, the
record reveals that the district court properly considered and denied Eby's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Eby's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 1st day of November 2012

~Y.-t/\
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of November 2012, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DANI EL LEE EBY
IDOC #56540
ISCI
PO Box 14
Boise, Idaho 38707

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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